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Insurance Law: Recent Interpretation of the
Temporary Substitute and Newly Acquired
Clauses in the Standard Family Auto Policy
Defendant Wesley Nyquist purchased an insurance policy
listing a 1958 Chevrolet effective November 15, 1966 to Novem-
ber 15, 1967 from plaintiff insurance company. On March 9,
1967 Nyquist sold his 1958 Chevrolet, but had acquired possession
of a 1961 Chevrolet in November, 1966 which remained in an in-
operative condition until August 18, 1967. Between the sale of
the 1958 Chevrolet and the repair of the 1961, defendant drove a
1960 Chevrolet owned by his mother. Defendant claimed that
his mother's Chevrolet should be covered under the policy as a
temporary substitute vehicle, a replacement vehicle or a non-
owned vehicle not furnished for regular use. Held, the 1961
Chevrolet replaced the vehicle described in the policy and there-
fore became the owned automobile covered by virtue of the au-
tomatic replacement provision. Since the 1961 Chevrolet was
withdrawn from normal use because of its inoperability, the 1960
Chevrolet was covered as a temporary substitute for the replace-
ment automobile. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Nyquist, 286
Minn. 157, 175 N.W.2d 494 (1970).
The Minnesota Supreme Court has found itself in a posi-
tion requiring interpretation of the "newly acquired"' and "tem-
porary substitute" clauses three times in less than fourteen
months.2 In construing these two clauses, the court has been
forced to reconcile conflicting judicial policies. On one hand
they are faced with the rising trend of public policy to view in-
surance as a means of protecting injured persons, and on the
other they are limited by the language of the insurance contract,
designed to indemnify the insured and protect the insurance
company from increased risk exposure. The court has not re-
solved this dichotomy with consistent results. In two of the three
cases coverage was denied, but in Nyquist the court, cognizant
of public interest, extended coverage to the insured by interrelat-
ing both the newly acquired and temporary substitute automo-
bile clauses.
Public policy has played a role of increased importance in
1. The terms "newly acquired" and "replacement vehicle" are
both used by the court to designate the clause here in question.
2. Fitch v. Bye, -Minm. -, 180 N.W.2d 866 (1970); Nyquist v.
St. Paul Fire & Marine, 286 Minm. 157, 175 N.W.2d 494 (1970); Dike v.
American Fain. Mut. Ins. Co., 284 Minn. 412, 170 N.W.2d 563 (1969).
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the courts' interpretation of insurance contracts.8 Both the tem-
porary substitute and the newly acquired automobile provisions
are for the insured's benefit, and are designed to make coverage
definite as to the vehicle the insured intends normally to use."
Ambiguity must be construed liberally in favor of the insured if
any construction is necessary.5 In addition, with the introduc-
tion of financial responsibility laws, the courts have found them-
selves more concerned with protecting the injured third party
than indemnifying the insured.6 Quaderer v. Integrity Mutual
Insurance Company held when construing the terms of a policy
it must be kept in mind that the public has an interest in having
automobiles insured." The insurance policy should be construed
to effect coverage if this can be done without doing violence to its
plain language and intent.9
The majority relied on the newly acquired auto clause to ex-
tend coverage from the 1958 to the 1961 Chevrolet, for which the
insured's mother's 1960 Chevrolet was a substitute. The 1963
Standard Family Automobile Liability Policy, used by plaintiff
insurance company, provides:
owned automobile means . .. (c) a private passenger, farm or
utility automobile ownership of which is acquired by the named
insured during the policy period, provided (1) it replaces an
owned automobile .... 0
The majority of courts have held the phrase is not ambiguous, as
3. American Indem. Co. v. Davis, 155 F. Supp. 47 (M.D. Ga.
1957); see also Minnesota Safety Responsibility Laws, MINN. STAT.
§ 170.25 (1969).
4. Lloyds Am. v. Ferguson, 116 F.2d 920 (5th Cir. 1941).
5. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 156 Cal. App. 2d 755, 320 P.2d 90(1958); Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lee, 119 Ga. App. 293, 166 S.E.2d
907 (1969). But see Farley v. American Auto., 137 W. Va. 455, 72 S.E.2d
520, 34 A.L.R.2d 933 (1952). See generally 7 AM. JuR. 2d Automobile
Insurance § 103 (1963).
6. Corcoran v. State Auto. Ass'n, 256 Minn. 259, 98 N.W.2d 50(1959); accord, Mueller v. American Indem. Co., 19 Wis. 2d 349, 120
N.W.2d 89 (1963); Wis. STAT. § 344.15(4) (1969). Wisconsin's Safety Re-
sponsibility Law, like Minnesota, is designed to protect the third party
beneficiary.
7. 263 Minn. 383, 116 N.W.2d 605 (1962).
8. Id. at 388 n.1, 116 N.W.2d at 608 n.1; American Indem. Co. v.
Davis, 155 F. Supp. 47, 51 (M.D. Ga. 1957); MmN. STAT. § 170.25 (1969)
(Safety Responsibility Law).
9. But see Gabrelcik v. National Indem. Co., 269 Minn. 445, 454;
131 N.W.2d 534, 540 (1964). The court appeared to reject the Quaderer
rationale, but a careful reading of the dissent and subsequent con-
curring opinions indicated this was not its intention.
10. For a complete text of the 1963 Revised Standard Provisions
see RisJoRD & AUSTiN, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE CASES-STANDARD
PROVIsIONS 186 (1964).
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long as the new auto is acquired after issuance of the policy and
during the policy period."' The new vehicle must be used as a re-
placement for the insured vehicle,12 although it is not necessary
that the insured vehicle be sold, as long as it is disabled or not
used.' 3 The time when the insured actually acquires ownership
of a new vehicle is often a material issue.' 4 The Minnesota rule
has been that the registration of an automobile establishes prima
facie that the registrant is the owner but evidence may be sub-
mitted to show that actual ownership is in another person.15
Dike v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company'0 was
the last Minnesota case decided before Nyquist which interpreted
the newly acquired automobile clause. In that case the insured
acquired a Jeep, to be used for clearing snow and other off-the-
highway purposes, with no intention of having it replace his in-
sured pickup. The Jeep was acquired before the renewal of the
pickup's policy, and subsequently the pickup was destroyed in
an accident. The court held that the Jeep could not qualify as a
newly acquired automobile. Justice Rogosheske wrote in the
unanimous decision:
It is fundamental that ambiguous insurance policy provi-
sions must be construed in favor of the insured. However, we
cannot so construe a policy contrary to its plain, unequivocal
language. We believe that plaintiff's policy plainly requires
that an automobile be acquired as a replacement for the auto-
mobile described in the policy.... Plaintiff acquired the
Jeep as an additional vehicle long before he wrecked the pick-
up.' 7
The second issue in the instant case was whether the
11. Yenowine v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 342 F.2d 957 (6th
Cir. 1965); cf. Mahaffey v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 175 So. 2d
905 (La. App. 1965).
12. Fleming v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 383 F.2d 145 (4th Cir.
1967); Lynam v. Employer's Liab. Assur. Corp., 218 F. Supp. 383 (D.
Del. 1963); Luckett v. Cowser, 39 Wis. 2d 224, 159 N.W.2d 94 (1968).
13. Maryland Indem. & Fire Ins. Exch. v. Steers, 221 Md. 380, 157
A.2d 803 (1960); Filaseta v. Pennsylvania Thresherman and Farmers
Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 209 Pa. Super. 322, 228 A.2d 18 (1967).
14. The majority rule seems to be that coverage will not attach in
absence of transfer of title. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 345 F.2d 11
(6th Cir. 1965); Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Northwest Mut. Ins. Co.,
382 P.2d 174 (Mo. App. 1963); Ostermiller v. Parker, 451 P.2d 515 (Mont
1968). Some courts have gone so far as to hold that no insurable inter-
est is acquired. Moore v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 381 S.W.2d
161 (Mo. App. 1964).
15. Carey v. Broadway Motors, Inc., 253 Minn. 333, 91 N.W.2d 753
(1958). See MINN. ST-T. § 168.15 (1969); accord, Southern Fire and Cas.
Co. v. Teal, 287 F. Supp. 617 (D. S.C. 1968); Poelman v. Payne, 332 Mich.
597, 52 N.W.2d 229 (1952).
16. 284 Minn. 412, 170 N.W.2d 563 (1969).
17. Id. at 417, 170 N.W.2d at 566 (emphasis added and footnotes
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Chevrolet qualified as a temporary substitute automobile. A
temporary substitute auto is defined in the 1963 Standard Family
Automobile Liability Policy as:
any automobile or trailer, not owned by the named insured,
while temporarily used with the permission of the owner as a
substitute for the owned automobile or trailer when with-
drawn from normal use because of its breakdown, repair, serv-
icing, loss or destruction.' 8
The purpose of the temporary substitute auto clause is not
to defeat liability, but to define coverage by limiting the in-
surer's risk to one operating vehicle per premium.19 This has
the effect of extending coverage temporarily and automatically
without the payment of additional premium when the insured
uses an automobile not described in the policy. 20
The courts have construed the words "while temporarily
used" liberally in favor of the insured. The word "temporary" has
no fixed meaning in the sense that it designates any distinct
period of time. Temporary has been held to be the antithesis of
permanent, 21 and whether the use is temporary or permanent
depends on the intention of the insured.
22
A "substitute vehicle" within the meaning of the policy is one
actually used in place of the specified automobile to the same ex-
omitted). This rationale is in accord with Brown v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 306 S.W.2d 836 (Ky. 1957) where the court stressed the
insurance company's right to refuse to insure an older car.
18. RISJORD & AusTIN, supra note 10, at 186. Except for the words
"not owned by the named insured" this provision has remained substan-
tially unchanged since'1947. The 1955 provisions also excluded vehicles
owned by the named insured's spouse (the policy definition of named in-
sured includes the spouse) if a resident of the same household. In the
1956 Standard Policy the ownership exclusion was omitted altogether,
but was readopted in 1958. The words "with the permission of the
owner" were adopted in 1963 in response to decisions like Densmore v.
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 221 F. Supp. 652 (W.D. Pa. 1963) in
which the court held the insurance company liable for an accident Dens-
more had while driving a stolen car.
19. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lee, 119 Ga. App. 293, 166
S.E.2d 907 (1969); CoucH ON INSURANCE 2d § 45:219 (1965).
20. Lewis v. Bradley, 7 Wis.2d 586, 97 N.W.2d 408 (1959); Comment,
52 MARQ. L. REv. 146 n.3 (1968). See also Lloyds Am. v. Ferguson, 116
F.2d 920 (5th Cir. 1941); Harte v. Peerless Ins. Co., 123 Vt. 120, 183 A.2d
223 (1962).
21. Fleckenstein v. Citizens' Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 326 Mich. 591,
40 N.W.2d 733 (1950); McManus v. Home Ins. Co., 201 Wis. 164, 229
N.W. 537 (1930).
22. Some courts have found it sufficient if the evidence showed
the intention of the owner of the substitute auto was that the insured's
use of it was to be temporary, especially if the owner maintained con-
trol over the vehicle. Little v. Safeguard Ins. Co., 137 So. 2d 415 (La.
App. 1962).
[Vol. 55:10321044
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tent as the insured vehicle would have been except for its with-
drawal from normal use.2 3 Substitution cannot be merely coin-
cidental, 24 and can be proved only by showing that except for the
breakdown, the insured car would have been used at the time and
in the circumstances involved.2
5
The temporary substitute auto provision can only be used to
extend coverage to a vehicle "not owned" by the named insured. -6
The linnesota court in Gabrelcik v. National Indemnity Com-
pany27 decided a case in which the insured, the owner of a taxi,
borrowed an automobile from her husband's used car lot to tem-
porarily-replace the insured vehicle while it was withdrawn from
normal use. By strict construction of the policy language, the
court held that since the replacement automobile was owned by
the husband of the insured, it was excluded from coverage under
the temporary substitute auto clause.2 8
In most of the cases involving the definition of a temporary
substitute auto the paramount question has been what consti-
23. Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Norman, 197 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1952);
Lewis v. Bradley, 7 Wis. 2d 586, 97 N.W.2d 408 (1959).
24. Strozewski v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 46 Wis. 2d 123,
174 N.W.2d 550 (1970); cf. Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Norman, 197 F.2d
67 (5th Cir. 1952).
25. Tanner v. Pennsylvania Thresherman and Farmers' Mut. Cas.
Ins. Co., 226 F.2d 498 (6th Cir. 1955).
26. Hunnicutt v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 255 N.C. 515, 122 S.E.2d 74
(1961); Utilities Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 207 Okla. 574, 251 P.2d 175 (1952).
Courts tend to be more lenient in construing this provision when the
insurance company is in no danger of double coverage. Glens Falls
Ins. Co. v. Gray, 386 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1967); Fleckenstein v. Citizens'
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 326 Mich. 591, 40 N.W.2d 733 (1950). Non-owner-
ship may be shown by failure to hold legal title. Little v. Safeguard
Ins. Co., 137 So. 2d 415 (La. App. 1962); Turpin v. Standard Reliance
Ins. Co., 169 Neb. 233, 99 N.W.2d 26 (1959); see Brown v. Security Fire
& Indem. Co., 244 F. Supp. 299 (W.Dl. Va. 1965); Bivins v. Ace Wrecking
& Excavating Co., 409 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. 1966); CoucH ON InSURANcE 2d
§ 45.232 (1965).
27: 269 Minn. 445, 131 N.W.2d 534 (1964).
28. The Gabrelcik court, however, was not deaf to public interest
and did not deny all chance of recovery to the injured party. Id. at
448 n.7, 131 N.W.2d at 536 n.7. To insure a taxi the insurance company
is generally required to file a certificate of coverage with the munici-
pality. For example, the MINNEAPOLs, MINN. ORDINANCE CODE § 463.030
(1970) provides:
No person shall operate or permit to be operated any taxicab
within the limits of the City,... unless and until the applicant
shall execute or obtain and file... either an insurance policy
... a self insurance certificate... or a bond.
When a certificate has been filed, there is considerable authority holding
that after a judgment is obtained against the insured, if it remains
unsatisfied, it may be collected from the insurer, and the injured party
is not subject to policy defenses. See MINN. STAT. §§ 555.01-.02 (1969).
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tutes "withdrawal from normal use because of its breakdown,
repair, servicing, loss or destruction."2 9  The majority position is
that the vehicle specified in the insurance policy must be involun-
tarily 30 withdrawn from all normal use before a temporary sub-
stitute will qualify for coverage. Iowa Mutual Insurance Com-
pany v. Addy 31 held that the insured vehicle had not been with-
drawn from normal use merely because it was fitted with heavy
tire chains and was low on gas. Where the insured vehicle was
not considered to be mechanically sound enough for an ex-
tended trip,3 2 or when the insured considered another vehicle to
be more suited to his needs,33 coverage has been denied. The
minority position contends that the insured can substitute
another vehicle if the declared automobile is disabled and
incapable of performing in its principle or normal use. Nelson
v. St. Paul Mercury Insurance Company3 4 held that the fact the
insured drove his Chevrolet on occasion after it was extensively
damaged did not defeat coverage as the car had been substan-
tially withdrawn from normal use. Withdrawal of the insured
vehicle need not be total, as long as it could not have been used
for the same purpose as the substituted vehicle because of its dis-
repair.35
The problem faced by the Nyquist court was how coverage
could be extended under the various "extended coverage" clauses
of the insurance contract when it was apparent that the insurer
had not been subjected to unconscionable risk. Because Wesley
Nyquist had driven his mother's 1960 Chevrolet for a period of
more than five months, using it without interruption for his
regular use, coverage clearly could not attach through the non-
owned auto clause.3 6 According to the uncontroverted evidence
29. See Elliott, The Insurance Definition of "Automobile," 46 NEB.
L. REv. 3 (1967).
30. See cases cited at note 48 infra.
31. 132 Colo. 202, 286 P.2d 622 (1955); see also Ransom v. Fidelity &
Cas. Co., 250 N.C. 60, 108 S.E.2d 22 (1959).
32. Erickson v. Genisot, 322 Mich. 303, 33 N.W.2d 803 (1948); At-
lantic Ins. Co. v. Gonzalez, 358 S.W.2d 716 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
33. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Western Fire Ins. Co., 196 F.
Supp. 419 (E.D. Ky. 1961); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Bass, 192
Tenn. 558, 241 S.W.2d 568 (1951); cf., e.g., Pennsylvania Cas. Co. v.
Suburban Serv. Bus Co., 211 S.W.2d 524 (Mo. App. 1948).
34. 83 S.D. 32, 153 N.W.2d 397 (1967).
35. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 156 Cal. App. 2d 755, 320 P.2d 90
(1958). See also Prudence Mut. Cas. Co. v. Sturms, 37 Ill. App. 2d 304,
185 N.E.2d 366 (1962); Dowell v. United Pac. Cas. Ins. Co., 191 Wash.
666, 72 P.2d 296 (1937).
36. A non-owned auto is defined as "an automobile or trailer not
owned by or furnished for the regular use of either the named insured
[Vol. 55:10321046
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the 1958 Chevrolet had been sold while it was still in operating
condition which required the court to find that the 1961 Chevro-
let was a replacement vehicle withdrawn from normal use. By
taking this intermediate step in order to fulfill the requirements
of the temporary substitute automobile clause, the court was able
to extend coverage to the insured while he was operating the
1960 Chevrolet.
The gravamen of the Nyquist court's rationale, as stated by
Justice Gallagher, was:
When construing an insurance policy this court is cogni-
zant of the public interest in having auiomobiles covered byliability insurance, and construes any ambiguities in the pol-
icy against the insurer since the insurer chose the language.37
This reasoning was first introduced to Minnesota in Quaderer,
which in turn adopted it from American Indemnity Company v.
Davis.38 Davis used the argument cautiously to extend coverage
under the newly acquired automobile clause, and issued with it a
caveat requiring the new automobile to be an actual replacement
for the declared vehicle. The majority in Gabrelcik0 stressed
that "the insurer is entitled to rely upon language of the policy
designed to accomplish reasonable and justifiable objectives."40
However, Justice Murphy's strong dissent in Gabrelcik4' proved
persuasive to the majority in Nyquist as they extended coverage
or any relative, other than a temporary substitute automobile" (empha-
sis added)._ RrsjoRD & Ausrn, supra note 10, at 186. This clause is de-
signed to provide coverage to the insured while he is driving a car not
owned by him for relatively short periods of time.
37. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Nyquist, 286 Minn. 157,
159, 175 N.W.2d 494, 496 (1970) citing Quaderer v. Integrity Mut Ins.
Co., 263 Minn. 383, 387, 116 N.W.2d 605, 608 (1962); see Minn. Safety
Responsibility Law, MinN. STAT. § 170.25 (1969).
38. 155 F. Supp. 47 (M.D. Ga. 1957).
39. Gabrelcik v. National Indem. Co., 269 Minn. 445, 131 N.W.2d
534 (1964). In a more recent case, Boedigheimer v. Taylor, 287 Minn.
323, 178 N.W.2d 610 (1970), the court denied coverage on the basis that
"[uJnambiguous words are to be given their natural and ordinary mean-
ing taken in their popular sense giving effect to the purpose of the
document as a whole." Id. at -, 178 N.W.2d at 613 (footnote omitted).
40. Auto insurance premium rates are structured in reliance on
the type of vehicle insured. The underwriting practices of the majority
of insurance companies surcharge liability coverage to compensate
for the increased risk exposure presented by Detroits new '!muscle
cars." TuE INSURANCE RATNG BOARD (IRB) 13, (2d reprint effective Sept
1, 1970) recommended premium rating factors, based on vehicle type,
that surcharged intermediate performance and sports cars 15%, and high
performance cars 30% of base premim.
41. Gabrelcik v. National Indem. Co., 269 Minn. 445, 131 N.W.2d 534
(1964). Dissenting Justice Murphy argued:
. The purpose of the policy was not only to indemnify the
insured but to protect the public. The agreement comprehended
1971] 1047
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to the policy holder on the basis of the overall intent of the
policy.
Nyquist rejected the majority position regarding interpreta-
tion of the newly acquired auto clause. Justice Gallagher rea-
soned that as long as there was only one operable car, coverage
existed under the policy. Considered within purely a public pol-
icy standard such reasoning is perhaps sound, but it may be dis-
credited by both a close analysis of the cases cited,42 and a review
of recent Minnesota precedent. It is peculiar that the Nyquist
court did not mention the precedent established by them less
than six months earlier in Dike v. American Family Mutual In-
surance Company.43 In Dike the court conclusively held the
newly acquired automobile provision to be unambiguous, and in
order to be "newly acquired" within its plain meaning an auto-
mobile must have been acquired after the commencement of the
policy period, and must replace the automobile described in the
policy. In the instant case the court disregarded this earlier prec-
edent by holding that the 1961 Chevrolet, which was not in
operating condition, could replace the 1958 Chevrolet.
The court held it made no difference that defendant Nyquist
acquired possession of the 1961 Chevrolet prior to the effec-
tive date of the policy, since ownership, a prerequisite to the op-
eration of the newly acquired clause, was acquired "sometime in
1967." By not determining the exact date ownership attached
the court leaves itself open to an anomalous result. If ownership
were not acquired prior to the date of the accident, the mother's
1960 Chevrolet could not qualify as a substitute for an owned
vehicle. The court merely places its emphasis on the fact that
that should the taxicab become disabled a substitute vehicle
would be used .... The important consideration was that the
substitute car be used as a taxicab.
Id. at 451, 131 N.W.2d at 538.
42. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mast, 52 Del. 127, 153 A.2d 893
(1959), stresses the term "replacement" as it is found in the insurance
contract and defines it to mean:
S.. To provide or produce a substitute or equivalent in
place of (a person or thing) .... II Shorter Oxford English
Dictionary 1706 (3rd Ed. Reprint 1947).
There is no evidence that the word "replace" has a mean-
ing peculiar to the insurance field, .... so the ordinary meaning
must govern.
Id. at 131, 153 A.2d at 895. This is to suggest that replacement must be
replacement "in use" and not merely one of ownership. In Nyquist the
court held the 1961 Chevrolet, inoperable at the time of acquisition,
was a replacement for the useable 1958 Chevrolet. See 7 AM. Jun. 2d
Automobile Insurance § 101 (1963).
43. 284 Minn. 412, 170 N.W.2d 563 (1969). See Quaderer v. Integ-
rity Mut. Ins. Co., 263 Minn. 383, 116 N.W.2d 605 (1962).
[Vol. 55:10321048
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only one vehicle was in use at a time, and the insurer was not
subjected to double coverage. Rationale such as this may have
inspired Chief Justice Knutson to write in his dissent: "It is not
our function to rewrite insurance policies so as to provide cover-
age which under the clear terms of the policy the parties have
not provided for."44
Realizing that the Nyquist decision could give rise to a broad
construction of the "newly acquired" clause, the court remedied
its possible error in a subsequent decision. In Fitch v. Bye45 the
court restricted the language of Nyquist to its particular facts,
and held that a replacement vehicle obtains coverage only when
the insured automobile has either been disposed of, or cannot be
rendered operable. The Fitch court further held that the use of
the words "acquires ownership" anticipates "future events sub-
sequent to the commencement of the policy period." 46
After laying the groundwork for its decision by interpreting
the intent of the insurance policy in the light most favorable to
the insured and finding the 1961 Chevrolet qualified as a newly
acquired auto, the court had but one more hurdle to clear. If
coverage were going to extend to the 1960 Chevrolet, it would
have to do so within the temporary substitute auto provision. At
this point two problems are encountered. One is the uncon-
troverted evidence that the temporary substitute vehicle was
used without restriction for a period of more than five months,
and the other is the nature of the withdrawal of the 1961 Chevro-
let from normal use.
In keeping with the rule of liberal construction in favor of
the insured, the word "temporary" was interpreted by the
Minnesota court to have no fixed temporal significance. No sin-
gle test can be applied in all situations involving a temporary
substitute, and Minnesota has taken the position that the length
of time is not controlling, as long as the insurance company is
not subject to double risk exposure, and the insured intends to
use the vehicle only temporarily.47
44. 286 Minn. at 163, 175 N.W.2d at 498 (1970).
45. - Minn. -, 180 N.W.2d 866, 869 (1970). This case was decided
eight months after Nyquist.
46. Id. at -, 180 N.W.2d at 869. This is a return to the position
taken in Dike. When these three recent Minnesota cases, Dike, Nyquist
and Fitch, are considered together they support the proposition that the
newly acquired auto clause cannot extend to a vehicle owned prior to
commencement of the policy, unless it can be conclusively shown that
the insurer could not have been subjected to double coverage.
47. Defendant Nyquist's intention is not easily ascertained by the
facts. He sold his 1958 Chevrolet on March 9, 1967, and was involved in
the accident with the temporary substitute auto on April 17, 1967 (39
1971] 1049
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The court found the term "withdrawn from normal use be-
cause of its breakdown, repair, servicing, loss or destruction" to
be ambiguous, and therefore also subject to liberal construction.
It concluded the vehicle was withdrawn by some unknown third
party, and was as a consequence within the meaning of the pro-
vision. The court's rationale is faulty in its failure to consider
from whose use the vehicle was withdrawn. On closer analysis it
becomes apparent that the replacement vehicle became relevant
only when it was withdrawn from the insured's use, and such
withdrawal in the instant case occurred when Nyquist volun-
tarily disposed of his 1958 Chevrolet in favor of the 1961 which
he knew to be in an inoperative condition. The overwhelming
majority of courts have held that the temporary substitute auto
clause is inoperable when the insured voluntarily withdraws the
declared vehicle from use in absence of a breakdown.48
The Minnesota court in Nyquist chose to interpret the com-
bination of the newly acquired and temporary substitute auto-
mobile provisions liberally as a general scheme to provide cov-
erage whenever a close reading of the policy will allow. Al-
though the court in Fitch expressed its intent to limit the Nyquist
decision, it also suggests that when the facts clearly demonstrate
the insurance company was not subjected to double risk exposure
and the persons insured are effectively limited to the named
policy holder, Nyquist may reappear. To hold otherwise would
allow the insurance companies the advantage of a windfall and
work injustice to the purpose and intent of assuring financial re-
sponsibility.
days later). The temporary substitute was continued in use until the re-
pair of the 1961 Chevrolet on August 18, 1967. The facts are silent as
to the reason for this delay.
48. In Lincombe v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 166 So. 2d 920(La. App. 1964), the insured traded his insured automobile but could
not get immediate delivery of his new car. The auto lent by the dealer
did not qualify for coverage as a temporary substitute auto. Travelers
Indem. Co. v. American Cas. Co., 226 F. Supp. 354 (S.D. W. Va. 1964)
held that the insured cannot lose the use of the insured vehicle through
repossession or voluntary sale and still invoke coverage under the tem-
porary substitute auto clause. See Hartford Acc. and Indem. Co. v.
Western Fire Ins. Co., 196 F. Supp. 419 (E.D. Ky. 1961). The exception
to this is when the sale of the insured vehicle is for junk because of
mechanical failure or a wreck which renders it unusable. Freeport
Motor Cas. Co. v. Tharp, 338 Ill. App. 593, 88 N.E.2d 499 (1949); Nelson
v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 83 S.D. 32, 153 N.W.2d 397 (1967); see
Continental Cas. Co. v. Ocean Acc. & Guar. Corp., 209 A.2d 743 (Del.
Super. 1965). Withdrawal can only result from breakdown, repair, serv-
icing, loss or destruction, not intentional overt acts of the insured. Nor-
mand v. Hertz Corp., 211 So. 2d 382 (La. App. 1968).
[Vol. 55:10321050
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Torts: Awareness of Condition Without Appreciation
of Its Hazard Precludes Recovery Under Theory
of Strict Products Liability
Plaintiff was the purchaser and operator of a snowmobile
manufactured by the defendant Rupp Manufacturing Company.
While plaintiff was operating the snowmobile over rough terrain
on a fox hunt, he drove the snowmobile into a ditch and the left
ski of the machine caught in the snow, stopping the snowmobile
abruptly. Plaintiff flew off the left side of the snowmobile strik-
ing his right knee against the protruding sparkplug, injuring
himself. Alleging the protruding sparkplug to be a defect in de-
sign of the snowmobile, the plaintiff brought suit against the de-
fendant manufacturer. The defendant appealed from an order
of the district court vacating a jury verdict for defendant and
granting a new trial on all issues, upon the exclusive ground that
the court committed an error of law in not submitting to the jury
an instruction on strict tort liability. The Minnesota Supreme
Court reversed the district court's order and reinstated the ver-
dict, holding, as a matter of law, that plaintiff's awareness of the
defective condition precluded him from recovery under the strict
liability theory. Magnuson v. Rupp Mfg., Inc., 285 Minn. 32, 171
N.W.2d 201 (1969).
Strict tort liability as applied to manufacturers of defective
products is a relatively new doctrine that is in a state of rapid
development and proliferation.1 Formerly, recovery against a
manufacturer was limited to the theories of negligence and
breach of contractual warranty. With the development of mod-
em market conditions such as remote manufacturers and spe-
cialized, complex production processes these two theories proved
inadequate to protect the consumer.2 Thus in 1963 the strict tort
liability theory was adopted by the California Supreme Court in
the landmark decision of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products.3
1. Prosser, Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
50 MAmw. L. REV. 791, 793 (1966).
2. Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 463, 150 P.2d
436, 441 (1944). In his famous concurring opinion in that case Justice
Traynor made the following observation:
An injured person ... is not ordinarily in a position to ...
identify the cause of the defect, for he can hardly be familiar
with the manufacturing process as the manufacturer himself is.
See also Note, Products Liability and Section 402A of the Restatement of
Torts, 55 GEo. L.J. 286, 288 (1966); Kessler, Products Liability, 76 YALE
LUJ. 887 (1967).
3. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
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In that case the California court held a manufacturer strictly
liable in tort when an article he placed on the market, know-
ing that it was to be used without inspection for defects, proved
to have a defect that caused injury to a human being. Subse-
quently the strict liability theory was adopted by the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts (1965) 4 and by many other states.5
There are several policy reasons underlying the adoption of
strict tort liability.6 First, the manufacturer is in the best posi-
tion to distribute equitably the cost of the inevitable injuries re-
sulting from use of defective products. 7 By raising his price,
the manufacturer can spread the loss over the entire community
4. RESTATEIENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965):
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unrea-
sonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his prop-
erty is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused
to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which
it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection 1 applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the prep-
aration and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product
from or entered into any contractual relation with the
seller.
5. Nalbandian v. Byron Jackson Pumps, Inc., 97 Ariz. 280, 287,
399 P.2d 681, 686 (1965) (concurring opinion); Garthwait v. Burglo, 153
Conn. 284, 216 A.2d 189 (1956); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612,
210 N.E.2d 182 (1965); Dealer's Transp. Co. v. Battery Distrib. Co., 402
S.W.2d 441 (Ky. 1965); Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85,
133 N.W.2d 129 (1965); State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113
(Miss. 1966); Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d
305 (1965); Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 1 Ohio App. 2d 374, 205
N.E.2d 92 (1965); Cochran v. Brooke, 243 Ore. 89, 409 P.2d 904 (1966);
Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966).
6. Keeton, Products Liability-Some Observations About the Al-
location of Risks, 64 MIcH. L. Rnv. 1329 (1966); Kessler, supra note 2;
Prosser, supra note 1 at 1122; Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.
2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944), Justice Traynor's concurring opinion
is an articulate explanation of some of the policy reasons for strict lia-
bility.
7. This policy reason receives heavy emphasis in the RESTATE-
WENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment c at 349 (1965):
On whatever theory, the justification for the strict liability has
been said to be that the seller, by marketing his product for
use and consumption has undertaken and assumed a special
responsibility toward any member of the consuming public
who may be injured by it; that the public has the right to and
does expect, in the case of products which it needs and for
which it is forced to rely upon the seller, that reputable sellers
will stand behind their goods; that public policy demands that
the burden of accidental injuries caused by products intended
for consumption be placed upon those who market them, and be
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of consumers rather than letting fate select at random the victim
who must bear the full loss. Second, the manufacturer is in the
best position to anticipate and protect against the hazards pre-
sented by the faulty products.3 There is an undeniable imbal-
ance of expertise between the manufacturer and the consumer
due to such factors as the consumer's lack of technical knowl-
edge, his inability to evaluate the quality of many goods and his
lack of opportunity to inspect due to the rapid flow of goods. By
contrast the manufacturer is or should be much better able to
judge the quality of the items which he produces and markets
and the statistical probability of a defect. Third, by placing the
goods on the market and by advertising manufacturers have
represented their products to be safe and suitable for use.9 In
the case of snowmobiles, the product at issue in the Magnuson
case, many television advertisements show contented consumers
speeding across rugged snowy terrain in their snowmobiles.
Such advertising lulls the vigilance of the consumer and causes
him to place confidence in the manufacturer to produce a safe
product. When the use intended by the manufacturer leads to
injury to a consumer because of the defective character of the
product, the manufacturer should not be able to avoid responsi-
bility.
In strict liability several defenses based upon plaintiff's con-
duct may be available to the manufacturer. It is held in such
cases, for example, that assumption of risk is a defense but con-
tributory negligence is not.10 Whether these defenses are ap-
treated as a cost of production against which liability insurance
can be obtained; and that the consumer of such products is en-
titled to the maximum of protection at the hands of someone,
and the proper persons to afford it are those who market the
products.
8. Kessler, supra note 6, at 926; Prosser, supra note 6, at 1122;
Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d at 462, 150 P.2d at 440-41
(concurring opinion):
Even if there is no negligence, however, public policy demands
that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively
reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective prod-
ucts that reach the market. It is evident that the manufacturer
can anticipate some hazards and guard against the occurrence
of others, as the public cannot.
9. Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d at 467, 150 P.2d
at 443; Prosser, supra note 6, at 1123:
The supplier, by placing the goods upon the market, represents
to the public that they are suitable and safe for use; and by
packaging, advertising or otherwise, he does everything that he
can to induce that belief. ... The supplier has invited and
solicited the use; and when it leads to disaster, he should not be
permitted to avoid responsibility by saying that he has made
no contact with the consumer.
10. Prosser, supra note 6, at 1147-48:
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plicable, however, depends upon the specific character of the con-
duct rather than whether it fits generally into one of these two
categories." The comments to Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 402A define those defenses in terms of the specific character of
the conduct:
If the injury results from abnormal handling, as where a
bottled beverage is knocked against a radiator to remove the
cap, or from abnormal preparation for use, as where too much
salt is added to food, or from abnormal consumption, as where
a child eats too much candy and is made ill, the seller is not
liable .... 12
... [C]ontributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a de-
fense when such negligence consists merely in a failure to dis-
cover the defect in the product, or to guard against the possibil-
ity of its existence. On the other hand the form of contribu-
tory negligence which consists in voluntarily and unreasonable
proceeding to encounter a known danger, and commonly passes
under the name of assumption of risk, is a defense under this
Section as in other cases of strict liability. If the user or con-
sumer discovers the defect and is aware of the danger, and nev-
ertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use of the product and
is injured by it, he is barred from recovery. 13
When the cases are examined, however, they fall into a very
consistent pattern, and it is only their language which is confus-
ing. Those which refuse to allow the defense [contributory neg-
ligence] have been cases in which the plaintiff negligently failed
to discover the defect in the product, or to guard against the
possibility of its existence. They are entirely consistent with
the general rule that such negligence is not a defense in an
action founded on strict liability. Those which have permitted
the defense all have been cases in which the plaintiff has dis-
covered the defect and the danger, and has proceeded neverthe-
less to make use of the product. They represent the form of
contributory negligence which consists of deliberately and un-
reasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger and is
quite often treated as assumption of risk. It is quite well
settled that this is a defense against other actions based on
strict liability.
See also Fake v. Addicks, 45 Minn. 37, 47 N.W. 450 (1890) (dictum).
11. Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 1057, 1101 (1967):
There are at least four different theories under which a de-
fendant may assert that a plaintiff's own conduct precludes him
from being able to hold the defendant strictly liable in tort:
(1) that the plaintiff negligently failed to discover the defective
condition of the defendant's product or to guard against the
possibility of its existence; (2) that the plaintiff assumed the
risk of the injuries or damage which he sustained, by voluntar-
ily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger;
(3) that the plaintiff's misuse of the defendant's product, ra-
ther than any defect in the product, caused the plaintiff's in-
juries or damages; (4) that the plaintiff's misuse of the defend-
ant's product concurred with the defectiveness of the product to
cause the plaintiff's injuries or damages.
See also Epstein, Product Liability: Defenses Based on Plaintiff's Con-
duct, 1968 UTAH L. REv. 267, 269.
12. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment h at 351
(1965).
13. Id., comment n at 356 (emphasis added).
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These official comments establish that abnormal use of the prod-
uct or discovering the danger and then voluntarily encountering
it are defenses to strict liability but a negligent failure by the
plaintiff to discover the dangerous qualities of the defect is not
a defense.
The doctrine of strict tort liability was adopted by the Min-
nesota Supreme Court in McCormack v. Hankschraft." In that
case a child was injured when the boiling water of a vaporizer
fell on her. It was found that although the design was intended
by the defendant to serve as a safety measure to avoid the
buildup of steam in the glass jar, it also had the effect of allowing
the water in the jar to gush out instantaneously when the va-
porizer tipped over. The court, after noting the strict liability
theory, by way of dictum stated:
This rule of strict tort liability ... qualifies as a tested le-
gal theory along with the traditional theories of negligence and
breach of warranty where the latter meet the purpose for which
liability should be imposed upon a supplier of a product How-
ever, in our view, enlarging a manufacturer's liability to those
injured by its products more adequately meets public policy
demands to protect consumers from the inevitable risks of bod-
ily harm created by mass production and complex marketing
conditions. In a case such as this, subjecting a manufacturer to
liability without proof of negligence or privity of contract, as
the rule intends, imposes the cost of injury resulting from a de-
fective product upon the maker, who can both most effectively
reduce or eliminate the hazard to life and health, and absorb
and pass on such costs, instead of upon the consumer, who
possesses neither the skill nor the means necessary to protect
himelf adequately from either the risk of injury or its disas-
trous consequences.1 5
Based on this statement, which reiterates some of the policy rea-
sons outlined earlier,16 it is certain that the doctrine of strict tort
liability as applied to manufacturers of defective products has
been accepted and approved by the Minnesota Supreme Court. 1"
In the Magnuson decision the court discussed several differ-
ent elements of the strict products liability doctrine. It em-
phasized that in order to recover the plaintiff must not be aware
of the defect.'8 The evidence indicated that the plaintiff un-
questionably was aware of the position of the sparkplug. It was
located at the top of the cylinder and faced towards the operator,
was six to eight inches above the seat, and extended approxi-
mately one inch beyond a metal cowling that surrounded the
14. 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967).
15. Id.at 338, 154N.W.2d at 500.
16. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
17. See Kerr v. Coming Glass Works, 284 Minn. 115, 169 N.W.2d
587 (1969).
18. 285 Minn. at 41, 171 N.W.2d at 207.
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motor. Plaintiff was a skilled mechanic who had worked on the
motor quite often and had removed and replaced the sparkplug
several times. The court held, therefore, that plaintiff's aware-
ness of the position of the sparkplug meant that it could not be
considered defective or unreasonably dangerous vis-d-vis the
plaintiff. The awareness of the position of the sparkplug also
served to prevent the defective condition from being the proxi-
mate cause of the injury.19 The court reasoned that the plain-
tiff's awareness of the sparkplug's position coupled with his
voluntary operation of the snowmobile constituted misuse of the
product and was the proximate cause of his injury. His re-
moval of a thin rubber insulator covering the sparkplug was said
to constitute mishandling. 20 The court pointed out that strict
liability is not absolute liability and the manufacturer of the
product is not responsible for any and every injury that results
from its use.21 Accordingly, said the Magnuson court, the courts
which adopt strict liability to supplement negligence must adopt
some rule or principles to serve as limiting factors. 22 It also in-
dicated that the plaintiff must prove that he exercised due care
for his own safety.28  Thus, in addition to its basic holding that a
plaintiff who is aware of the defect cannot recover under strict
liability, the court included dicta in its decision that could have
a significant impact on the development of products liability in
Minnesota. The following analysis will identify the shortcomings
of the court's reasoning and explain why the Minnesota court has
misapplied the law of strict products liability in this case.
As a basis for its holding that plaintiff's awareness of the de-
fect defeats a recovery in strict liability, the Magnuson court re-
lied on Greenman v. Yuba Power Products.2" In that case the
injuries of the plaintiff were caused by the defective design of a
Shopsmith, a combination power tool. In Greenman the plain-
tiff's witnesses testified that inadequate set screws were used to
hold the machine together and that there were other more se-
cure ways of fastening the parts of the machine together. The
court held the manufacturer strictly liable in tort, defining the
19. Id. at 43, 171 N.W.2d at 208.
20. Id. There was a factual issue, not treated by the court, as to
whether this insulator served to protect operators from injuries such as
occurred in this case or only protected the electrical connection against
the weather. See text accompanying note 67 infra.
21. Id. at 45, 171 N.W.2d at 209.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 43, 171 N.W.2d at 208.
24. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
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essential elements of the doctrine as follows:
To establish the manufacturer's liability it was sufficient
that plaintiff proved that he was injured while using the Shop-
smith in a way it was intended to be used as a result of a de-
fect in design and manufacture of which the plaintiff was not
aware that made the Shopsmith unsafe for its intended use.2 5
Based on this statement from Greenman, the Magnuson court
concluded that a plaintiff who is aware of the defect cannot re-
cover. The statement might also be interpreted, however, as re-
quiring not just an awareness of the defect but also an awareness
of the "unsafe" qualities presented by the defect. This apparent
ambiguity is not explained elsewhere in the Greenman decision
nor do the facts of the case provide any assistance in determining
the proper interpretation. Despite this ambiguity, the function
of this "awareness" principle in strict liability of manufacturers
is to carry over from the field of negligence the assumption of
risk defense which has traditionally been available in strict lia-
bility action.26 This defense has required not just a recognition
of the presence of the defective condition, but rather a subjective
knowledge and appreciation of the danger involved so that the
decision to encounter it will be meaningful..2 7 In strict liability
actions, as in negligence, the plaintiff cannot meaningfully or in-
telligently assume the risk unless he is aware of the hazardous
qualities of the defect. Therefore, the strict liability counter-
part to assumption of risk, "awareness of the defect," should also
require a finding that the plaintiff, in addition to being aware of
the defective condition, subjectively recognized and appreciated
the danger presented by it, before recovery is barred. Yet the
Magnuson court made no such finding, but was instead content
to conclude that plaintiff's knowledge of the condition alone was
sufficient to bar his recovery. In this conclusion lies the critical
error of the court.
While the theoretical basis of liability may have changed
from negligence to strict liability, there is no reason to believe
that anything less stringent than a knowledge and appreciation
of the danger is required. To require a less stringent standard
would be contrary to the main function of the strict liability doc-
25. Id. at 64, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
26. REsT mwT (SucoNi) or ToRTs § 4Q2A, comment n at 356
(1965).
27. Assumption of risk is based upon a subjective analysis and may
be found only when the plaintiff has: (1) knowledge of the risk, (2)
appreciated the risk and (3) voluntarily chosen to encounter it. Parness
v. Economics Laboratory, Inc., 284 Minn. 381, 170 N.W.2d 554 (1969);
Coenan v. Buckman Bldg. Corp., 278 Minn. 193, 153 N.W.2d 329 (1967);
Schrader v. Kriesel, 232 Minn. 238, 45 N.W.2d 395 (1950).
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trine which is to broaden the scope of liability of the manufac-
turer. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, comment n at 356
(1965),28 unmistakably leads to this conclusion. It explicitly
states that voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encoun-
ter a known danger, commonly known as assumption of risk, is a
defense to a strict liability action and that the consumer is barred
from recovery if he discovers the defect "and is aware of the
danger.'29 Although the court in Magnuson noted this section
of the Restatement in its decision with approval,80 this particu-
lar comment to the Restatement was not discussed. There is
no question but that it requires a knowledge and appreciation of
the danger rather than just an awareness of the physical pres-
ence of the defect as was deemed sufficient in Magnuson. Other
cases and authorities further support this conclusion.3 1 For ex-
28. [C]ontributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense
when such negligence consists merely in a failure to discover the
defect in the product, or to guard against the possibility of its
existence. On the other hand the form of contributory negli-
gence which consists in voluntarily and unreasonably proceed-
ing to encounter a known danger, and commonly passes under
the name of assumption of risk, is a defense under this section
as in other cases of strict liability. If the user or consumer dis-
covers the defect and is aware of the danger, and nevertheless
proceeds unreasonably to make use of the product and is injured
by it, he is barred from recovery.
29. Id. (emphasis added).
30. 285 Minn. at 38, 171 N.W.2d at 205.
31. See generally Oregon Farm Bureau v. E. L. Caldwell, 306 F.
Supp. 835, 839 (D. Ore. 1969); Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp.
427, 429 (N.D. Ind. 1965); Barth v. B. F. Goodrich, 265 Cal. App. 2d 228,
243, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306, 314 (1968):
The only form of plaintiff's negligence that is a defense to strict
liability is that which consists involuntarily and unreasonably
proceeding to encounter a known danger, more commonly
referred to as assumption of risk. For such a defense to arise,
the user or consumer must become aware of the defect and
the danger and still proceed unreasonably to make use of the
product (emphasis added).
Adams v. Ford Motor Co., 103 Ill. App. 2d 356, 360, 243 N.E.2d 843, 846
(1968); Corvette v. Serjeant Metal Products, - Ind. -, 258 N.E.2d 652,
657 (1970); Baker v. Rosemurgy, 4 Mich. App. 195, 200, 144 N.W.2d 660,
662 (1966); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing Co., 45 N.J. 434, 459, 212
A.2d 769, 782 (1965); Ferraro v. Ford Motor Co., 423 Pa. 324, 327, 223 A.2d
746, 748 (1966); Shamrock Fuel and Oil v. Tunks, 416 S.W.2d 779, 785
(Texas 1967); see also Bushnell, Illusory Defense of Contributory Neg-
ligence in Products Liability, 12 Ct.v.-MAR. L. REv. 412, 418:
While assumption of risk is a most favored contention of man-
ufacturer-defendants, it is quite obvious that the facts must in-
deed be gross for the defense to be sustained. Unless and un-
til the facts clearly establish that plaintiff knew, or should have
known, of the danger and clearly appreciated, or should have
appreciated, the danger, we have at most a fact question for thejury and, in all probability, a judgment for plaintiff.
Keeton, Assumption of Products Risk, 19 Sw. L.J. 61, 66 (1965); Prosser,
supra note 1, at 1147; Comment, Strict Liability and the Defenses, 18
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ample, the Illinois Supreme Court discussed the character of the
awareness defense in Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co.3 2 In that case
the plaintiff was injured when a trencher he was operating
jumped backward and struck him. The jury found that there
were several design defects including the absence of a safety de-
vice. Such absence was a defective condition whose dangerous
propensities, however, apparently were not fully appreciated by
the plaintiff, a qualified operating engineer. In holding for the
plaintiff, the court noted that there was no evidence that would
support a finding that the plaintiff had proceeded unreasonably
to use the trencher after discovery of the defect and becoming
aware of the danger, or that he had unreasonably proceeded to
encounter a known danger.33 Earlier the court emphasized that
an analysis of the doctrine of strict liability and the purposes to
be achieved by its adoption require that the test of contributory
fault be subjective, not objective. That subjective standard,
said the court, is whether the particular plaintiff has proceeded
unreasonably to use the product after he has discovered the de-
fect and become aware of the danger, or has voluntarily and un-
reasonably proceeded to encounter a known danger.3 4
As contrasted with this standard as developed by the Illinois
court, the test adopted by the Magnuson court required only that
the plaintiff recognize the physical presence of the defect and not
the dangerous propensities arising from it. By adopting this
standard, the court has ignored an essential element of the
awareness defense as developed by the Restatement and other
courts3 5 --a knowledge and appreciation of the danger presented
DE PAUL L. REV. 223, 240-41:
While contributory negligence per se is not a defense to strict
products liability, the particular contributory fault which
would constitute such a defense overlaps the doctrine of con-
tributory negligence and is a narrow form of it. In substance,
the courts have all defined the nature of the defense as "volun-
tarily and unreasonably encountering a known danger," which
conduct would certainly comprise a form of contributory neg-
ligence. The former is concerned with a subjective standard of
conduct, (requiring that the plaintiff have actual knowledge of
the risk or danger), and the latter is concerned with an objec-
tive standard (requiring only the knowledge that a reasonably
prudent man would have).
32. 93 Ill. App. 2d 334, 236 N.E.2d 125 (1968).
33. Id. at 364, 236 N.E.2d at 141.
34. Id. at 348, 236 N.E.2d at 127 (emphasis added).
35. See Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427, 429 (N.D.
Ind. 1965); Barth v. B.F. Goodrich, 265 Cal App. 2d 228, 243, 71 Cal.
Rptr. 306, 314 (1968); Ferraro v. Ford Motor Co., 423 Pa. 324, 327, 223
A.2d 746, 748 (1966). See also RnsTATnmznT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A,
romment n at 356 (1965).
19711 1059
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
by the defect. This failure might be illusory if the court here
assumed that the plaintiff recognized and appreciated the danger.
This is not, however, apparent from the decision itself or the
briefs. That the plaintiff was aware of the position of the spark-
plug and that he was a skilled mechanic are not alone sufficient
to enable the court to conclude as a matter of law that he sub-
jectively recognized and appreciated the danger presented by the
protruding sparkplug.36 Thus the court, in barring plaintiff's
recovery as a matter of law, departed from legal precedent by
failing to require that plaintiff recognize and appreciate the
danger presented by the protruding sparkplug rather than
merely have knowledge of its position.
In its application of the awareness defense, the critical short-
coming in the court's analysis is its failure to take cognizance
of the fact that without knowledge of the danger, as distin-
guished from knowledge of the physical presence of the protrud-
ing sparkplug, the plaintiff was certainly in no position to en-
counter intelligently and voluntarily the risk presented by the
snowmobile. The plaintiff cannot assume the risk of a danger of
which he is ignorant. The very terms of the phrase "assumption
of risk" require that the plaintiff be aware of the hazard or risk,
not just the defective condition. In order to bar recovery in strict
liability, there should be a knowledge and appreciation of the
danger itself and not just the facts which constitute it. Without
knowledge of the danger presented by the protruding sparkplug,
plaintiff's decision to operate the snowmobile precisely as the
manufacturer intended should not be construed to indicate that
he accepted the risk of the danger presented by the defect. Al-
though the court consciously avoids the use of the term "assump-
tion of risk," the "awareness" theory serves the same function
but overlooks the essential element-knowledge and appreciation
of the danger. The court noted that when a court adopts strict
liability it should establish some rules or principles to substitute
for negligence as a delimiting principle.3 7 The court's reason for
36. The fact that the plaintiff was a mechanic would be more rele-
vant in proving an awareness of the danger had there been a mechanical
failure rather than a design defect. Given the nature of the defect in
this case, his mechanical knowledge would be of no special benefit to
him; and he is, in fact, in no better position than the average consumer
in terms of foreseeing the danger presented by the protruding spark-
plug. In his concurring opinion Justice Rogosheske admits there is
insufficient evidence from which a trier of fact would be compelled to
conclude that plaintiff subjectively realized the nature of the risk or dan-
ger. 285 Minn. at 48, 171 N.W.2d at 211.
37. Id. at 45, 171 N.W.2d at 209.
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these delimiting principles was that otherwise the manufacturer
would be liable for all accidents involving his products. The rule
adopted in this case, however, unduly limits the manufacturer's
liability. It essentially makes awareness a much more stringent
test of plaintiff's conduct in strict liability than its counterpart--
assumption of risk--enforces in a negligence case. Thus the
court has reached the anomalous position where it requires a
higher standard of proof for the plaintiff in a strict liability ac-
tion than in a negligence action.
Several factors may have influenced the court to forego use
of the term assumption of risk and to dispense with a finding of
its essential elements. First, as stated above, the court wanted to
adopt some principles to confine the scope of the manufacturer's
liability. 'Second, the evidence itself was not sufficient to war-
rant the conclusion as a matter of law that assumption of risk
barred recovery.3 8 Third, the court may have avoided using
the term because of the confusion that surrounds its meaning in
the negligence field3 9 and sought to define the defense in terms
of the specific conduct of the plaintiff. Although this is certainly
desirable, the authorities adopting this approach have neverthe-
less required a knowledge of the .danger other than merely an
awareness of the physical presence of the defect.40
In a second aspect of its decision the Magnuson court made
virtually the same error as with the awareness defense. It indi-
cated that the protruding sparkplug was also an "obvious" de-
fect;41 and, in the sense that the condition was visible for all to
see, it was unquestionably correct. When defects are obvious,
courts frequently invoke a doctrine developed in Campo v. Scho-
38. Justice Rogosheske admitted this in his concurring opinion. Id.
at 48, 171 N.W.2d at 211. The evidence that plaintiff was aware of the
position of the sparkplug and had repaired it several times is sufficient
to get the assumption of risk issue to the jury, but based on the strin-
gent subjective nature of the assumption of risk defense, is not suffi-
cient to compel the conclusion as a matter of law that plaintiff assumed
the risk.39. Knutson v. Arrigoni ,Bros. Co., 275 Minn. 408, 147 N.W.2d 561
(1966); Hubenette v. Ostby, 213 Minn. 349, 6 N.W.2d 637 (1942); Swen-
son v. Slawik, 236 Minn. 403, 53 N.W.2d 107 (1952); see generally Com-
ment, Distinctions Between Assumption of Risk and Contributory Neg-jigence, 23 WAS. & LEE L. REv. 91 (1966); Greenhill, Assumption of
Risk, 16 BAYLOR L. REv. 111 (1964).
40. See Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427, 429 (NiD.
Ind. 1965); Barth v. B.F. Goodrich, 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 243, 71 Cal.
Rptr. 306, 314 (1968); Ferraro v. Ford Motor Co., 423 Pa. 324, 327, 223
A.2d 746, 748 (1966).
41. 285 Minn. at 45, 171 N.W.2d at 209.
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field.42 In that negligence action, plaintiff's hand became caught
in an onion-topping machine; he alleged the absence of a safety
device as a design defect. The court denied recovery holding that
the danger presented by the absence of the safety device was ob-
vious to the plaintiff. Therefore, no further duty is owed by
the manufacturer because it is not foreseeable that any reason-
able man would be injured if he exercised due care. Although
there is language in the decision which indicates that only the
defect, as distinguished from the danger, need be obvious to in-
voke the doctrine, 43 the court clearly determined that the danger
was obvious since it refers to the condition as being a "patent
peril or from a source manifestly dangerous, '44 comparing it to
an axe or buzz saw.45 The Magnuson court states that when a
condition, as distinguished from the danger presented by it, is
obvious the plaintiff must show he made proper use of the prod-
uct. As it did in the application of the "awareness" principle, the
court again erred by inquiring whether the defect itself, rather
than the dangers it presented, was obvious.
One case which stated that the obviousness of the danger
and not the defect must exist was Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co.40
There the plaintiff was injured by a defectively designed fork-
lift. The court made the following comment:
[T]he hidden nature of the defect... [is] no real limitation
since the defendant company could not have been negligent in
manufacturing a product whose danger would be perceived and
appreciated by all reasonable persons exercising ordinary care.
It is not negligent for one to manufacture and sell an axe or
power saw because the dangers are obvious and the manu-
facturer can reasonably expect others in the exercise of ordi-
nary prudence to perceive and appreciate the dangers. But it
might be negligent to fashion the axe or saw from defective
metal, undetectable by prudent users. "Hidden" is merely a
concise way of saying that the danger could not be reasonably
perceived and appreciated. 47
Thus the fact that the protruding sparkplug was not a latent
defect and was visible for all to observe should not bar recovery
unless its injury inflicting potential was also apparent. Yet the
Magnuson court fails to inquire as to whether the "danger" is ob-
vious. Had they done so on these facts they may have reached
42. 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1958).
43. Throughout the opinion the court refers to the "defect or dan-
ger" as being obvious. From this alternative characterization, it may be
argued that if the defect is patent, then perhaps that is all that is re-
quired to come within the reach of the doctrine.
44. 301 N.Y. at 472, 95 N.E.2d at 804.
45. Id.
46. 237 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ind. 1965).
47. Id. at 430.
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the conclusion that the danger was obvious. However, the pro-
truding sparkplug is not comparable to an axe or power saw
where the nature and operation of the hazard are easily per-
ceived. Whether it is within the competence of a mechanic or
consumer, lulled into a sense of complacency by frequent tele-
vision advertisements, to foresee that a sudden stop of the snow-
mobile would cause his knee to strike a protruding sparkplug is
questionable. From the policy reasons outlined earlier,4 8 the
manufacturer should have recognized that this is a type of de-
sign hazard that creates a great liklihood of injury in the nor-
mal operation of a snowmobile. Although there is some au-
thority for the court's position, 4 9 the better view is that the cru-
cial inquiry must be whether the danger was obvious and the fact
that the defect itself is visible is not controlling.Y°
The Magnuson court, in barring plaintiff's recovery without
requiring a finding that he subjectively recognized the danger,
has certainly not furthered the policy objectives of strict prod-
ucts liability outlined earlier.51 It has placed neither the loss on
the one who can best distribute it nor the responsibility for an-
48. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
49. Messina v. Clark Equip. Co., 263 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1959). In
that case plaintiffs intestate was killed when the scissor arms and bucket
from an earth moving machine he was operating fell on him. Alleged
as the defect was the failure of the manufacturer to provide a safety
device. Citing Campo, the court denied recovery on the ground that the
defect was a patent one and known to the decedent. Judge Clark dis-
sented strongly arguing that the danger was not known to the dece-
dent, only the parts of the earth mover which by their improper design
were visible and apparent. He emphasized that Campo required a
knowledge of the danger rather than the physical presence of the de-
fective condition.
50. flnicki v. Montgomery Ward, 371 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1966). The
plaintiff sued for injuries suffered as a result of operating a lawn
mower. As defects he alleged the absence of the following: (1) remote
control switch; (2) a protective house covering the starting knob; (3) a
protective shroud over the moving blade; (4) failure to have the blades
located further from the bottom of the metal housing. Despite the fact
that these defects were obvious to anyone observing the machine, the
court applied strict liability. See generally Olsen v. Royal Metals Corp.,
392 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1968); Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of Design
or Directions for Use of a Product, 71 YALE L.J. 816, 838 (1962). Profes-
sor Noel asserts that the Campo doctrine indicates simply that the obvi-
ousness of the defect or danger is only one significant factor in the de-
termination of whether or not the manufacturer has created an unrea-
sonable risk. He observes:
The concept that the danger itself, as distinguished from the
defect, must be latent, bears more precisely on the issue of un-
reasonable risk, but courts are apt to find that the danger is
obvious whenever the alleged defect of design is obvious.
51. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
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ticipating defects in design on the one who can best anticipate
them. By placing the burden of discovery of the dangerous
propensities of a defective design on the consumer, it has placed
a higher responsibility on him than on the manufacturer who
is responsible for marketing the product. The manufacturer,
after extended experience with the machine, is more cognizant
of the danger lurking in the protruding sparkplug. To permit
the manufacturer to avoid liability after an accident such as
plaintiff's and to compel the user to bear the burden of discover-
ing what the manufacturer himself has failed to observe is to
place the burden upon precisely the party whom the policy con-
siderations underlying strict liability have dictated that it should
not lie. This case permits manufacturers to market defectively
designed products with impunity provided the physical presence
of the condition is visible to unsuspecting consumers.
Although not mentioned by the Magnuson court, the new
Minnesota comparative negligence statute52 may have some ef-
fect on defenses based on plaintiff's conduct in a strict liability
action. That statute provides that contributory negligence is no
longer a complete bar to recovery but will only serve to reduce
the plaintiff's damages. A thorough discussion of the implica-
tions of the comparative negligence statute is, however, far be-
yond the scope of this Comment and it is necessary to note only
one important case. A recent Wisconsin strict liability decision,
Dippel v. Sciano,53 construed a similar statute 54 to apply to de-
fenses other than contributory negligence such as assumption of
risk and abnormal use of the product. The effect of this decision
is to eliminate such defenses as a complete bar to plaintiff's re-
covery and, as with contributory negligence, to allow them only
to reduce the amount of damages recoverable by the plaintiff. A
similar interpretation of the new Minnesota statute would have a
52. MiNN. STAT. § 604.01 (1969):
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by
any person or his legal representative to recover damages for
negligence resulting in death or injury to person or property,
if such negligence was not as great as the negligence of the
person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages al-
lowed shall be diminished in the proportion to the amount of
negligence attributable to the person recovering.
53. 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
54. Wis. STAT. 331.045 (1931):
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by
any person or his legal representative to recover damages for
negligence resulting in death or injury to person or property,if such negligence was not as great as the negligence of the
person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages al-
lowed shall be diminished in the proportion to the amount of
negligence attributable to the person recovering.
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significant impact on defenses based on plaintiff's conduct in
strict liability actions in this state.
The court's discussion and application of the defense of ab-
normal or unintended use also warrants criticism. The court
stated that use of the snowmobile after knowledge of the loca-
tion of the sparkplug constituted misuse of the product.55 It is
certainly true that plaintiff in a products liability case must
prove that he used the product as it was intended to be used, and
that abnormal use will defeat his claim. 6  Plaintiff is barred
from recovery, however, only when he has made an unforesee-
able use of the product, such as using an antiseptic as a mouth-
wash,57 or driving on wheels at a speed in excess of rated ca-
pacity.58 In the Magnuson case the plaintiff used the snowmo-
bile precisely as it was intended to be used and as the manu-
facturer's advertisements indicated it could be used-he drove it
across a snow-covered field at a high rate of speed. There was
certainly nothing abnormal or unforeseeable about such use of
a snowmobile. While labeling plaintiff's operation of the snow-
mobile when he was aware of the defect as misuse is not illogi-
cal, such reasoning normally does not speak to misuse but rather
to the defense of voluntarily encountering a known danger. If
we follow the court's novel interpretation of the misuse doctrine
then it would be impossible for an operator to drive a similarly
designed snowmobile under any circumstances without misusing
it.
Another element of the court's decision susceptible to criti-
cism is its discussion of the contributory negligence defense in a
strict products liability context. The court strongly implied that
the plaintiff must prove freedom from contributory negligence as
a condition precedent to recovery in a strict liability action. Re-
ferring to the Illinois decision of People ex rel. General Motors
Corp. v. Bua,59 with respect to the elements that plaintiff must
prove in a strict liability case, the court stated: "But, in addi-
tion, the Illinois court indicated that it is still necessary to prove
that the plaintiff was in the exercise of due care for his own
safety."60 This indicates that the court may require the plaintiff
55. 285 Minn. at 43, 171 N.W.2d at 208.
56. REsTmmuiT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment h at 351
(1965).
57. Williams v. S. HL Kress & Co., 48 Wash. 2d 88, 291 P.2d 662
(1955).
58. McCurter v. Norton Co., 263 Cal. App. 2d 402, 69 Cal. Rptr.
493 (1968).
59. 37 I 2d 180, 226 N.E.2d 6 (1967).
60. 285 Mlnn. at 43, 171 N.W.2d at 208.
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in a strict liability case to prove freedom from contributory negli-
gence. Bua was not a good choice of authority for this rule be-
cause in Minnesota contributory negligence is an affirmative de-
fense to be proved by the defendant. 61 In Illinois, however,
where the plaintiff traditionally has the burden of proving free-
dom from contributory negligence, 62 there is obviously a ques-
tion as to whether this practice is to be continued in strict prod-
ucts liability cases. Thus the Magnuson court lifted the burden
of proof on contributory negligence completely out of context
from a state that has always required the plaintiff to prove free-
dom from contributory negligence and attempted to apply it in
Minnesota where it has traditionally been an affirmative defense.
This error is further compounded by the fact that a subsequent
Illinois decision reversed the portion of the Bua case set out
above prior to the use of it by the Minnesota court in Magnuson,
and held that, henceforth in Illinois, contributory negligence in
strict liability cases is to be treated as an affirmative defense.1 '
It then went on to define contributory negligence as voluntarily
and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger."
Bua therefore lends no support to the Minnesota court's implica-
tion that the plaintiff must prove freedom from contributory
negligence in order to recover in strict liability.
One further aspect of the decision also deserves comment al-
though the court's rather cursory discussion of this aspect of the
case leads to the conclusion that it is of limited importance. The
court indicated that plaintiff's removal of a thin rubber cover
over the sparkplug constituted mishandling which would also bar
his recovery.65 The Restatement clearly provides that the man-
ufacturer is not liable when the injury occurs due to subsequent
mishandling by the consumer.6 6 However, whether the removal
61. McCormick v. Malecha, 266 Minn. 33, 122 N.W.2d 446 (1963);
MmN. R. Civ. P. 8.03.
62. Vierke v. Sunset Valley Creamery Co., 58 Ill. App. 2d 323,
326, 208 N.E.2d 305, 307 (1965).
63. Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 93 Ill. App. 2d 334, 347, 236 N.E.2d
125, 132 (1968). The court was faced with the question of whether the
plaintiff is required to plead freedom from contributory negligence.
The court said the statements in Bua had a limited purpose and meant
only that contributory negligence is a defense to strict liability. It
then concluded: "[W]e hold that in this action, based upon strict lia-
bility in tort, the trial court correctly held contributory negligence to be
an affirmative defense."
Consequently, the current Illinois rule requires defendant, not plaintiff,
to plead and prove contributory negligence.
64. Id.
65. 285 Minn. at 43, 171 N.W.2d at 208.
66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment g at 351
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of the rubber cover was such mishandling is not at all certain. It
is significant to note the following statement in the respondent's
brief:
Actually the insulator which was installed on the machine
was a thin rubber insulator which was patently not designed
for the purpose of protecting the operator but rather was de-
signed to protect the connection against weather.67
If the cover was not designed to protect consumers from injuries
due to sudden stops of the snowmobile, there is a factual issue of
whether the sparkplug would have still been dangerous had the
insulator remained in place. The fact that the court placed rel-
atively slight reliance on this aspect of the case serves to indicate
that the mishandling defense was tenuous on the facts presented.
The Magnuson case will have a significant impact on the de-
velopment of strict liability in Minnesota. With regard to the
"awareness" holding, the court may choose to minimize its effect
in future cases by limiting it to the facts of Magnuson and assert
that, on those facts, the court assumed that the plaintiff was
aware of the danger presented by the sparkplug. Thus, in sub-
sequent cases, the court could still require a knowledge and ap-
preciation of the danger before the claim of the plaintiff is barred.
Although this is not the interpretation suggested by the language
of the decision, it would serve to avoid many of the anomalous
repercussions of the decision outlined earlier in this Comment.
On the other hand, the court may continue to require only an
awareness of the condition, as distinguished from the danger pre-
sented by the condition, and thereby undermine the development
of strict liability in Minnesota. Based on the decision itself, the
latter course seems more likely because the complete failure of
the court to inquire into plaintiff's awareness of the danger leads
to the unmistakable conclusion that the court thought such a re-
quirement irrelevant if, indeed, the distinction were perceived
at all. The elements of the decision concerning misuse and bur-
den of proof on contributory negligence are so obviously incor-
rect that they should not be followed. The decision dealt with
many aspects of products liability and, as indicated throughout
this Comment, raises the possibility of several novel limitations
on the doctrine of strict products liability in Minnesota which
have not been adopted in any other jurisdiction. As pointed out
(1965); "[T]he seller is not liable when he delivers the product in a safe
condition, and subsequent mishandling or other causes make it harmful
by the time it is consumed."
67. Respondent's Brief at 2, Magnuson v. Rupp Mfg., Inc., 285 Minn.
32, 171 N.W.2d 201 (1969).
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by the concurring opinion,68 it is difficult to ascertain the basis
of the court's opinion, but perhaps the decision's confusing and
obscure rationale will readily lend itself to corrective revision
in the future.
68. 285 Minn. at 46, 171 N.W.2d at 211.
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